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"CAT-OUT-OF-THE-BAG" &
"BREAK-IN-THE-STREAM-OF-EVENTS":
MASSACHUSETTS' REJECTION OF
OREGON v. ELSTAD FOR
SUPPRESSION OF WARNED STATEMENTS
MADE AFTER A MIRANDA VIOLATION
KATHERINE

E.

McMAHON*

INTRODUCTION**

Central to our system of federalism is the concept that the
United States Supreme Court stands as the final interpreter of the
United States Constitution. 1 While
a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restric
tions on police activity than those [the United States Supreme]
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional stan
dards2 [,] •.• a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a
matter of federal constitutional law when [the Supreme] Court

* Assistant District Attorney for the Suffolk District of Massachusetts, Chief of
the Appellate Division and Director of Superior Court Training. Associate Editor,
1997-98, Massachusetts Law Review; Managing Editor, 1981-82, Western New England
Law Review; J.D., cum laude, Western New England College School of Law; B.A., cum
laude, Fairfield University. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of the District Attorney for the Suffolk
District.
** Parallel citations have been added to this article for the convenience of
Massachusetts' practitioners.
1. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 360 n.12 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur
ring) (stating that the United States Supreme Court, not the United States Congress,
bears the paramount responsibility of construing the United States Constitution);
Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1952) (stating that the United States Supreme
Court is the "ultimate arbiter" of this question: whether a state prisoner had been de
prived of his federal constitutional rights, and adding that the Court will review a state
court decision unless it rests upon an independent state ground); see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authorit[ies] ....").
2. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (citations omitted); accord Attorney
General v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 796, 444 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1982).
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specifically refrains from imposing them. 3

Principles of federalism dictate that, when the United States
Supreme Court has defined the contours of law enforcement con
duct, the several states must adhere to those precepts when apply
ing federal law. 4
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized that the "state
courts are the ultimate expositors of state law ... except in extreme
circumstances."5 The Court has further realized that it is the "very
essence of our federalism' that the States should have the widest
latitude in the administration of their own systems of criminal jus
tice."6 Nonetheless, the Court has long employed the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution to extend federal
constitutional rights to defendants in state criminal cases.?
The Fourteenth Amendment has been the vehicle by which the
Supreme Court has evaluated the voluntariness of confessions in
3. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (footnote & citations omitted) (rejecting the defendant's
contention that Oregon constitutional principles applied to the question which had
been briefed and argued under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution); accord Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979) (rejecting the
California Supreme Court's extension of request for counsel to a juvenile's request for a
probation officer during custodial interrogation).
4. See, e.g., Hass, 420 U.S. at 719 (Hass argued that since Oregon's own law was
more restrictive than federal law, the Supreme Court could not compel it to conform to
federal law; since the case involved question of federal, not state law, the state court
could not impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than those
enunciated by the Supreme Court); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968) (stat
ing that while the State of New York is free to develop its own state law, it could not
tread on protections enunciated in the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution). .
5. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,691 (1975) (emphasis added); accord Com
monwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530, 350 N.E.2d 444, 454 (1976).
6. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958), overruled in part by Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); accord Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958), over
ruled in part by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). "It goes without saying that
preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of
the Federal Government ... and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so
as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States." Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197,201 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding that the double
jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Four
teenth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination protections extended to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (holding that the right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment extended to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-67, 660 (1961) (the search and seizure
protections found in the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the Four
teenth Amendment).
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state prosecutions,S and the Court has ruled that involuntary state
ments are inadmissible in evidence in state criminal trials. 9 Further,
in Miranda v. Arizona,lO the Court applied the self-incrimination
protections found within the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment, and es
tablished a rule excluding from evidence statements taken in viola
tion of the Miranda warnings. l l If police officers obtain a
statement without administering the Miranda warnings, a per se
rule of exclusion bars the statement from evidence, for the state
ment presumably is tainted by the inherently coercive atmosphere
of custodial interrogation. 12
Some courts, including the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court ("SJC"), use federal tests for voluntariness-the "cat-out-of
the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" analyses 13-to
resolve the question of the admissibility in evidence of a properly
warned statement after an initial Miranda violation, extending Mi
randa's per se rule of exclusion to the latter statement.1 4 These
courts presume that the Miranda violation taints the later
statement. 15
8. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 n.2, 320-22 (1959); Brown v. Missis
sippi, 297 U.S. 278,279,285-86 (1936); see also infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Spano, 360 U.S. at 321,323-24 (the defendant's will was overborne by
official pressure, his fatigue, and false sympathy; patent intent by police officers to ex
tract a confession from him; statement suppressed, and conviction reversed); Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,153-54 (1944) (the defendant was held incommunicado for
thirty-six hours, not allowed to sleep or rest, and questioned without any respite; state
ment should have been suppressed; conviction reversed).
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. See id. at 467; see also infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. The Miranda
warnings include: the right to remain silent; the right to have counsel present at ques
tioning; the right to have counsel appointed if the detainee cannot afford one; and the
caveat that anything the detainee says can be used against him in court. See Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467-71.
12. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,306-07 (1985); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
13. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. The "break-in-the-stream-of
events" test looks to whether there has been a break in the causal connection between
the initial coercion, reSUlting in the first statement, and the second statement. See EL
stad, 470 U.S. at 305-06; Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982). The "cat-out-of
the-bag" test considers whether the suspect believes that, by giving the first statement,
he has spilled the proverbial beans and has no choice but to give a second statement.
See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368
Mass. 662, 686, 335 N.E.2d 660, 675 (1975).
14. See infra notes 88-135 and accompanying text for the SJC's treatment of these
issues.
15. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18 (noting that a "handful of courts" used
Supreme Court precedents concerning coerced confessions on the question of Miranda
violations); Commonwealth v. Smith, 412 Mass. 823, 829, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1291-92
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In Oregon v. Elstad,16 however, the Supreme Court rejected
the notion of a presumptive taint and explained that the "cat-out
of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests apply
only to the question of voluntariness, not to the effect of an initial
Miranda violation on the admissibility in evidence of a later, prop
erly warned statementP The Supreme Court limited Miranda's
presumption of taint to the initial unwarned statement, noting that
the per se exclusionary rule bars the statement from evidence even.
if it is made voluntarily. IS The Elstad Court declared that if the
first, unwarned statement is voluntary, a second, properly warned
statement is admissible in evidence if it, too, is voluntary.1 9 The
Court concluded that the proper administration of Miranda warn
ings should cure the condition which renders the first, voluntary
statement inadmissible and allow admission in evidence of the sec
ond, warned statement. 20
Even when the Supreme Court has spoken on a matter of fed
eral constitutional law, as in Elstad, a state still can impose constric
tions of its own design on police activity under its own state law. 21
In recent years, the Massachusetts SJC has turned repeatedly to the
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts22 when it has viewed federal constitutional rules as
too restrictive of citizens' rights. 23 This resort to state constitutional
(1992) (holding that an admission made in violation of Miranda is presumed to taint
latter statements, and the provision of the Miranda warnings alone are insufficient to
cure the taint); see also infra note 136 and cases cited therein.
16. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
17. See id. at 318.
18. See id. at 307.
19. See id. at 317-18; see also infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
20. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11.
21. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 530, 350 N.E.2d 444, 454-55 (1976).
22. See MASS. CONST. part 1, art. 1-30 (composing the Declaration of Rights of
the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 Mass. 382, 388, 681 N.E.2d 818, 823
(1997) (stating that the right to conflict-free counsel under Article Twelve of the Massa
chusetts Declaration of Rights does not require a showing of prejudice if an actual
conflict exists, in contrast to the test under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution recited in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980»; Commonwealth v.
Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 631, 677 N.E.2d 652, 662 (1997) (companion cases) (noting
that the confrontation right under Article Twelve is more specific than that under the
Sixth Amendment, requiring face-to-face confrontation between a criminal defendant
and the witnesses at trial); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 785-86, 665 N.E.2d
93,95-96 (1996) (rejecting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), and following
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), to determine what constitutes a
seizure under Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights); Common
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protections is a trend which has been seized upon by other jurisdic
tions.24 On occasion, the SJC also has turned to Massachusetts
common law.25 The self-incrimination prophylactics established in
wealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458, 462, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259-60 (1995) (holding that if
out-of-court identification is unduly suggestive, it must be suppressed, and any other
identifications are admissible only if the prosecution proves that they stem from an
independent source; rejecting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), as the test
under Article Twelve); Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692, 695-96, 632 N.E.2d
1200, 1202-03 (1994) (utilizing state test for ineffective assistance of counsel, as it
deemed Article 1\velve more protective of a criminal defendant than the Sixth Amend
ment); Jenkins v. Chief Justice, 416 Mass. 221, 232-33, 619 N.E.2d 324, 332 (1993) (hold
ing that although under federal system pretrial detention of up to forty-eight hours is
constitutional, per County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), no more than
twenty-four hours is permitted under Article Fourteen); Opinions of the Justices, 412
Mass. 1201, 1210, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1078 (1992) (stating that an arrestee's refusal to
submit to a breath or blood-alcohol test is inadmissible in evidence under Article
1\velve, although admissible under the Fifth Amendment, per South Dakota v. Neville,
459 U.S. 553 (1983)); Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 411 Mass. 328,333-34,582 N.E.2d 523,
526 (1991) (random urinalysis of police officers is contrary to Article Fourteen's protec
tions against unreasonable searches, although not apparently a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, under Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1989)); Commonwealth
v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592,600-01,550 N.E.2d 121, 126 (1990) (rejecting United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), and upholding automatic standing to challenge searches
under Article Fourteen); Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 67-69, 507 N.E.2d
1029, 1032-33 (1987) (companion cases) (warrantless interception by law enforcement
agents of conversation with one party's consent permitted under Fourth Amendment,
per United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), but a warrant is required, even with
one party's consent, under Article Fourteen); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363,
374-75,476 N.E.2d 548, 556-57 (1985) (rejection of federal totality of the circumstances
test for probable cause enunciated in lllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), in favor of
obsolete federal test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), under Article Fourteen). See generally Charles H.
Baron, The Supreme Judicial Court in its Fourth Century: Meeting the Challenge of the
"New Constitutional Revolution," 77 MAss. L. REv. 35, 35-36, 38-43 (1992); Herbert P.
Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to
Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 887, 921
28 (1980).
24. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114 (Cal. 1975) (holding that
full body search is permitted under state constitution only for the limited purpose of
finding weapons, in contrast to United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); State v.
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Haw. 1971) (rejecting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), under state constitution); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 624 (Me. 1972)
(although the United States Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972),
said that prosecution could establish voluntariness of a defendant's confession by a pre
ponderance of the evidence, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the standard
was proof beyond a reasonable doubt under state constitution); see also William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489, 498-502 (1977); Note, Stepping into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on
State Rather than Federal Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 339, 340-65 (1978); Jefferey
White, Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court
Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 737,738,749-77 (1976).
25. See Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 408-09, 412-13, 589 N.E.2d
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Miranda,26 however, find their source exclusively in the Fifth
Amendment?? not Massachusetts law, for the SJC has not adopted
the Miranda warnings under either the state constitution or state
common law. 28
In Commonwealth v. Smith,29 the SJC nonetheless departed
from the United States Supreme Court's determination of the effect
of a Miranda violation on a subsequent; warned confession, as
enunciated in Elstad,3° and applied the "cat-out-of-the-bag" and
the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" analyses-explicitly rejected
by Elstad 31 -to the question of a subsequent, warned statement's
admissibility in evidence. 32 The court justified its adoption of the
review standards as common-law adjuncts to the Miranda warn
ings. 33 It held:
1216,1220-21,1222-23 (1992) (creating a common-law test for granting a new trial when
the defendant claints that the prosecution has withheld exculpatory evidence; test more
protective of defendants than the federal test); Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass.
325, 332 n.14, 496 N.E.2d 652, 657 n.14 (1986) (state double jeopardy protections exist
pursuant to the common law, not the constitution, and are more protective than federal
protections).
.
26. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Miranda
requisites, which mandate that law enforcement agents inform a person subjected to
custodial interrogation that he has the right to remain silent, that he has a right to have
an attorney present during questioning, that counsel will be· appointed for him if he
cannot afford an attorney, and that anything he says can be used against hint in a court
of law. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). A statement made in
violation of Miranda is subject to a per se rille of exclusion. See id. at 444.
27. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the United States Supreme Court
made the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution applicable to the states,
via the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: See id. at 6; accord
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688-89 (1993). In Miranda, the Supreme Coilrt ex
tended the Fifth Amendment's safeguards against custodial interrogations to the states.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; accord Commonwealth v. Miranda, 37 Mass. App. Ct.
939, 940, 641 N.E.2d 139, 140 (1994).
28. See Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 318 n.5, 607 N.E.2d 1005, 1009
n.5 (1993) (declining to consider any state law question regarding the issue of adequacy
of Miranda warnings given to the defendant, and noting that the court had not adopted
the Miranda warnings under the state constitution); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413
Mass. 521, 530-31, 597 N.E.2d' 1363, 1368-69 (1992) (noting that the SJC has not
adopted Miranda, or similar warnings under Article Twelve, because the Miranda
warnings also furnish information about state constitutional rights).
29. 412 Mass. 823, 593 N.E.2d 1288 (1992).
30. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
31. See id. at 304-06, 311.
32. See Smith, 412 Mass. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296. The "break-in-the-stream-of
events" and the "cat-out-of-the-bag" analyses are discussed at infra notes 60-70 and the
accompanying text.
33. See Smith, 412 Mass. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296 (declaring that the court
would follow Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), as a com
mon-law rule of evidence); see also Snyder, 413 Mass. at 531, 597 N.E.2d at 1368-69
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[W]here Federal law requires the administration of Miranda warn
ings to a person in custody, the admissibility of incriminatory
statements obtained in the circumstances that appear here [,a
second, properly warned statement after an initial statement in
violation of Miranda,] will, as [a] matter of State common law, be
governed by the principles stated in Commonwealth v. Haas. 34

Yet, the SJC has never adopted the Miranda warnings them
selves as a matter of state law. 35 The alternate analyses embraced
in Smith as tests for admissibility therefore constitute an impermis
sible disregard for controlling federal authority defining the test for
the admission in evidence of a subsequent, warned statement after
an initia~ Miranda violation. 36 Where the Supreme Court has de
(citing Smith, the court noted that on occasion it had adopted "adjuncts" to the Mi
randa warnings under state common law); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass. 275,
279,521 N.E.2d 1368, 1371 (1988) (discussing the interested adult doctrine for admissi
bility of juveniles' confessions, a doctrine devised under the common law, which is an
"adjunct" to the Miranda requisites). It is of interest to note that, at the time the SJC
adopted the interested adult doctrine for juveniles, the United States Supreme Court
had not applied the Miranda warnings to the custodial interrogation of minors. See
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 130-31, 130 n.l, 132 n.2, 135, 449 N.E.2d
654,655 & n.l, 656 n.2 (1983) (stating that In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which applied
the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination protections to juveniles in delinquency pro
ceedings, see id. at 55, did not mandate that the Miranda warnings apply to juveniles;
and noting that Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), assumed without deciding that
the Miranda warnings are necessary for juveniles, see id. 707 n.4). Thus, the interested
adult "adjunct" is not actually attached to the Miranda warnings. See THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 22 (2d ed. 1992) (defining ad
junct as "[s]omething attached to another in a dependent or subordinate position"; syn
onym of appendage).
34. Smith, 412 Mass. at 824, 593 N.E.2d at 1289 (emphasis added) (citing Com
monwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), which had employed both
the "cat-out-of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests to the question
of the effect of a Miranda violation on a later, properly warned statement). See infra,
notes 184-225 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Smith.
35. See Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 318 n.5, 607 N.E.2d 1005, 1009
n.5 (1993); Snyder, 413 Mass. at 530-31, 597 N.E.2d at 1368-69.
36. In one notable instance, the Massachusetts SJC did not fare well in reinter
preting federal constitutional precedent. In 1983, the court declined to follow Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), to determine whether probable cause existed under the
Fourth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 566-69, 458 N.E.2d
717,719-21 (1983). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Upton court, con
cluding that the SJC misunderstood Gates as a refinement, rather than a rejection, of
the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727
(1984); see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 114 (1964). Onremand, the SJC adopted the Aguilar-Spinelli test under Arti
cle Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which is the state constitu
tional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Upton, 394 Mass. at
374-75,476 N.E.2d at 556-57; see also supra note 23 (providing examples of cases where
the SJC has provided the defendant more protection than warranted under the United
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cided what test must be employed to determine the application of a
federal exclusionary rule concerning a federal constitutional right,
and where Massachusetts has not adopted the Miranda rights
within its own law, the state cannot advance tests rejected by the
Supreme Court, under its own law, to decide whether the federal
exclusionary rule should apply.37 Further, although it embraced the
two tests as a matter of state common law, the Smith court provided
no explicit elucidation of the common-law source for the two tests,
nor any guidance as to why two tests are necessary and which analy
sis applies in a given case. Finally, in interpreting the tests, the
court has moved from a subjective determination to an objective
one, skewing the proper focus and possibly resulting in the suppres
sion of wholly voluntary statements due to a purely technical Mi
randa violation.
In Part I, this article will discuss the origins of, and rationale
for, the Miranda warnings, as well as the question of voluntariness
of custodial statements. It will review the historical tests applied to
voluntariness issues and violations of Miranda in Part II. It will
States Constitution). By contrast, in Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 399 Mass. 17, 502
N.E.2d 516 (1987), the court refused to adopt United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985), concerning discovery requests, and instead adhered to Massachusetts precedent,
which it viewed to possess "more prudent safeguards of defendants' rights." Gallarelli,
399 Mass. at 21 & n.5, 502 N.E.2d at 519 & n.5. The court later noted that it had not
shown its hand in Gallarelli; in articulating further refinement of the state discovery
test, the court in that case had not specified whether its approach, based on Massachu
setts case law, was under the constitution or common law. See Commonwealth v. Thc
ceri, 412 Mass. 401, 408, 589 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (1992). Gallarelli and Tucceri, however,
are founded on a body of Massachusetts case law and therefore constitute state com
mon-law tests concerning discovery. Indeed, the Tucceri court recognized that it had
fashioned a common-law discovery rule: See Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 412-13, 589 N.E.2d at
1223; see also Lyons v. Howard, 250 F.2d 912, 915 (1st Cir. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (federal common law is the body of decisional law devel
oped by the federal courts); Commonwealth v. Aldoupolis, 390 Mass. 438, 446, 457
N.E.2d 268, 273 (1983) (companion cases) (noting that common-law precedent, in both
the state's decisional law and reports of the King's Bench, allowed a trial judge to select
a jury from a foreign venire when an impartial jury could not be selected from the
county venire); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 345-46 (4th ed. 1968) (common law stems
"from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing
such usages and customs ..."; "[i]n a wider sense than any of the [preceding defini
tions], the 'common law' may designate all that part of the positive law, juristic theory,
and ancient custom of any state or nation"). In both Gallarelli and Tucceri, the court
adhered to established state case law, and in Upton, the court specifically adopted its
own probable cause test under the state constitution. It is clear that, when deviating
from a federal constitutional standard, the court, either expressly or impliedly, must
establish an independent state constitutional or common-law ground. See supra notes
2-4, 21 and accompanying text. As noted above, Miranda is not part of the state consti
tutional or common-law scheme. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 2-4, cases cited therein and the accompanying text.
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examine, in Part III, the federal analysis established by Elstad. It
will consider the post-Elstad Massachusetts twin tests, their effi
cacy, and their application in Part IV. In conclusion, the article will
explain how the SJC legitimately could have established its own ex
clusionary rule under the state constitution, not the common law,
and how the court has refashioned the two voluntariness tests away
from consideration of the suspect's mental state to an objective test
bordering on a per se rule of exclusion for all statements following
an initial, technical Miranda violation. This rigid rule may be too
exacting for law enforcement agents and society to bear, for it may
result in the exclusion from evidence of wholly voluntary and relia
ble statements due to noncoercive missteps by police officers.
I.

MIRANDA'S ORIGINS

&

REQUISITES

The United States Supreme Court, troubled by the coercive at
mosphere present in state law enforcement agents' questioning of
suspects,38 employed the United States Constitution to provide pro
tections to persons subjected to questioning by state police person
nel.3 9 As Chief Justice Earl Warren expounded:
[W]e are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental
interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law en
forcement and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual
members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of
law enforcement. ... The abhorrence of society to the use of
involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent un
trustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves. 4o
38. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193-95 (1957) (incommunicado deten
tion); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1954) (psychiatric inducement); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (continuous questioning); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 281-83 (1936) (physical beating).
39. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315, 321-24 (1959) (noting that case to
be "another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether a confession was
properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment"; the defendant was
a foreign-born man with little education and a history of emotional instability, who had
been questioned by "many" men for eight straight hours before he confessed; statement
had to be suppressed); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393-401 (1958) (examining
under the Fourteenth Amendment the circumstances surrounding a confession; the de
fendant was lassoed with a rope and dragged toward a tree; the defendant confessed
some twenty hours later and alleged no other physical or mental coercion).
40. Spano, 360 U.S. at 315,320-21.
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The Court had concerns not only with the inherent unreliability of a
coerced confession, but with the unlawful conduct of police officers.
Beginning in 1936, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
confessions in state cases under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, to determine whether the statements
were coerced. 41 Coercion includes threats, violence, direct or im
plied promises, and any improper influence. 42 A coerced statement
is deemed inadmissible in evidence; a confession extorted through
torture or some other means of coercion offends principles of due
process. 43
In 1964, in Massiah v. United States,44 the Court held that the
right to counsel established by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution applied to postindictment statements elicited by
law enforcement agents in the absence of counse1. 45 Later that
41. See, e.g., id. at 321 nn.2 & 3, 321-23 (questioning begun in the evening, and did
not conclude until the morning; persistent questions despite the suspect's refusal to
speak on the advice of counsel; the police officers ignored the suspect's repeated re
quests to contact his attorney and compelled his childhood friend to make false state
ments designed to elicit a confession; the suspect was emotionally unstable, tense, and
had been discharged from the military due to a psychiatric disorder); Ashcraft v. Ten
nessee, 322 U.S. 143, 145, 149-50, 152-53 (1944) (the defendant was brought into a room
and placed under a light; the police officers quizzed him in "relays" over a thirty-six
hour period; the Court concluded that the statement was "not voluntary but come
pelled"); Brown, 297 U.S. at 279, 282, 285-86, 287 (one defendant was hung twice from
a tree, tied to a tree and whipped, released, again taken into custody, and whipped until
he confessed; other defendants were stripped of their clothing and beaten with a leather
strap with buckles on it; the defendants were told that they would be beaten until they
confessed, and until they confessed in "correct" detail; the confessions were extracted
by torture; convictions based in part on involuntary confessions offended due process
and therefore were void); see also Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (the
Court noted the established practice, beginning with Brown, of reviewing coerced con
fessions in state cases under the Fourteenth Amendment in the thirty years prior to the
application of the Fifth Amendment to states); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
285-88 (1991) (citing the Supreme Court cases reviewing confessions in state cases for
coerciveness under the Fourteenth Amendment).
42. See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 753 (1970); see also KENT B. SMITH, 30 MASSACHUSElTS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 366 (West 2d ed. 1983).
43. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (stating that it is a viola
tion of due process to admit an involuntary statement into evidence, regardless of its
truth or falsity; cannot coerce a defendant to prove the charge against him "out of his
own mouth"); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1940) (finding it offensive to
due process and to civilization to use coerced statements obtained by secret inquisition
against defendant at trial).
44. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
45. See id. at 205-06. The Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the states in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
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year, in Escobedo v. Illinois,46 the Court extended the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to preindictment custodial interroga
tions in certain circumstances. 47 In both Massiah and Escobedo,
the Supreme Court viewed the presence and advice of counsel as
important to offset the possibility of coercion in a custodial
setting. 48
Two years later, in Miranda, the Court expressly applied the
Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination protections to the states. 49
Recognizing the coercion inherent in a custodial setting,SO the Mi
randa Court mandated that a person in custody,S1 subjected to in
terrogation,s2 be informed "in clear and unequivocal terms that he
46. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
47. See id. at 490-91. The circumstances are: the investigation has focused on the
suspect; he is in custody; statements are elicited during questioning; he requests and is
denied counsel; and he has not been informed of his right to remain silent. See id. The
Supreme Court later recognized Escobedo as a Fifth Amendment case. See Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429 (1986); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches
at the onset of adversarial criminal judicial proceedings against a defendant. See
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428; United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180,187 (1984); Kirby, 406
U.S. at 689-90. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to the preindict
ment stage. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187; Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690.
48. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-91 (noting possibilities of abuse, including bul
lying, physical force, and torture, as well as the history of extorted confessions); Mas
siah, 377 U.S. at 204-06 (expressing concern over "secret interrogations" taking place
absent the effective assistance of counsel).
"
49. See MiIanda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); supra notes 10-11 and the
accompanying text.
50. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ("[I]nherently compelling pressures which work
to undermine the individual's will to"resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely.").
51. See id. The Court held that the Miranda warnings are required whenever a
person is questioned "while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." Id. at 444; accord Commonwealth v. McDonough, 400 Mass. 639,
655, 511 N.E.2d 551, 561 (1987). In determining whether a suspect is in custody for
purposes of Miranda, the courts consider a number of factors, including the nature of
the crime, the site of the interrogation, the status of the investigation at the time of
questioning, the police officers' conduct toward the suspect, the suspect's reasonable
belief as to his freedom of action, and his ability to leave the place of questioning. See
Commonwealth v. Merritt, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 604-05, 441 N.E.2d 532, 535-36
(1982); Commonwealth v. Doyle, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 793, 429 N.E.2d 346, 350
(1981).
"
52. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Interrogation constitutes express questioning or
its functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980); Com
monwealth v. Rubio, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 506, 511, 540 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1989). Interroga
tion includes both words and actions, beyond those normally attendant to arrest and
custody, which a police officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat
ing response from a suspect. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302; Rubio, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at
512, 540 N.E.2d at 192. A reviewing court will look to both the suspect's perceptions
and the police officers' intent in determining whether the police officers engaged in
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has the right to remain silent,"53 that if he chooses to speak, any
thing he says can and will be used against him in court,54 that he has
the right to have counsel present at questioning,55 and that if he
does not have or cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
to represent him.56 Once the detainee receives the Miranda warn
ings and asserts his right to remain silent, questioning must cease. 57
Similarly, if the detainee wishes the presence and advice of counsel,
all questioning must abate until an attorney is present. 58 Stateinterrogation. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7; Rubio, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 512, 540
N.E.2d at 192-93.
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
54. See id. at 469.
55. See id. The Court noted that "the right to have counsel present at the interro
gation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege ...." Id.
The right to counsel in this context stems from a defendant's Fifth, not Sixth, Amend
ment interests. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 n.5 (1984); Common
wealth v. Stirk, 392 Mass. 909, 911, 467 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1984); see also supra note 47,
cases cited therein and the accompanying text.
56. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472-73. The Court termed the Miranda warnings
"procedural safeguards" of the self-incrimination privilege. [d. at 478-79. They are not
part of the constitutional privilege itself, but are measures to insure that the right is
protected. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 444 (1974); see also infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
57. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. The detainee also has the right to cut off
questioning at any time. See id. If a defendant claims that he asserted his right to si
lence, the issue is whether the suspect's '''right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously
honored.'" Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
474, 479); accord Commonwealth v. Gallant, 381 Mass. 465, 468, 410 N.E.2d 704, 706
(1980) (companion cases); Commonwealth v. D'Entremont, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 474,477,
632 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (1994). But Miranda did not "create a per se proscription of
indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on the subject,
once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent." Mosley, 423 U.S. at
102-03; accord United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378, 1382-83 (1st Cir. 1992);
D'Entremont, 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 477,632 N.E.2d at 1241. The Mosley Court consid
ered several factors in determining whether that defendant's right to cut off questioning
had been scrupulously honored, including: whether, upon his assertion of his right, the
law enforcement agents immediately ceased questioning him; whether a significant pe
riod of time elapsed before further questioning; and whether he received "fresh" Mi
randa warnings before further interrogation. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106; see also
Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 1992). The hiatus of time does not
control. See Barone, 968 F.2d at 1383; United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.
1988). Police officers must refrain from any coercive behavior during that interim. See,
e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 301, 305 & n.5, 306 (11th Cir. 1993) (while
twenty minutes elapsed, the police officers encouraged the defendant to talk); Barone,
968 F.2d at 1380, 1384 (after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent, the police
officers repeatedly encouraged him to talk during a two-hour period); Singletary, 952
F.2d at 1293 (when the defendant asserted her right to remain silent, the police officers
ignored her and continued with their questioning).
58. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. The Miranda right to counsel is distinct from
the right to remain silent. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988) (right to
remain silent different from request for counsel; law enforcement agents can never pro
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ments made in violation of Miranda are inadmissible in evidence at
trial, for they are presumptively tainted. 59
II.
A.

MIRANDA VERSUS VOLUNTARINESS

Origins of "Cat-out-of-the-Bag" & "Break-in-the-Stream-of
Events" Tests

Courts generally engage in a two-tier analysis on the question
of the admissibility in evidence of a defendant's custodial state
ments: whether the defendant made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his Miranda rights, under the Fifth Amendment;60 and
whether he made the statements voluntarily, under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 61 While interrelated, the two inquiries are distinct. 62
The courts generally consider the same factors on the dual ques
tions of waiver and voluntariness, which include the suspect's con
duct and characteristics, as well as the law enforcement agents'
ceed with questioning without the presence of an attorney, if requested by the de
tainee); Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n.10 (Miranda's discussion of right to counsel applied
different procedural safeguards for that right); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876,
882, 884, 406 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (1980) (Mosley involved right to remain silent, not
claim of denial of right to an attorney). If a suspect exercises his right to counsel, ques
tioning must cease and cannot resume until an attorney is obtained for him, unless the
suspect himself initiates further communication. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1981); D'Entremont, 36 Mass. App. Ct. at 478, 632 N.E.2d at 1242. Unlike the
right to remain silent, the right to counsel, once invoked, creates a per se proscription
against further questioning initiated by law enforcement agents.
59. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Commonwealth v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 268,
450 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1983). If questioning proceeds without counsel, the government
bears the "heavy burden" to prove that the detainee knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
475. That burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Parker,
402 Mass. 333,340,522 N.E.2d 924, 928 (1988) (companion cases); Commonwealth v.
Day, 387 Mass. 915, 921, 444 N.E.2d 384, 387 (1983). There is no distinction between
confessions and admissions under Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476; Common
wealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422, 431, 399 N.E.2d 460, 467 (1980). The exclusionary rule
applies even if the statement is exculpatory. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477; Common
wealth v. Gil, 393 Mass. 204, 212, 471 N.E.2d 30, 37 (1984).
60. See Parker, 402 Mass. at 340, 522 N.E.2d at 928; Day, 387 Mass. at 920, 444
N.E.2d at 387. "The record must affirmatively indicate not merely that the suspect or
the accused comprehended his rights but intentionally relinquished them." Common
wealth v. Williams, 378 Mass. 217, 225, 391 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (1979); accord Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404 (1977); Commonwealth v. Dustin, 373 Mass. 612, 615, 368
N.E.2d 1388, 1391 (1977).
61. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); Commonwealth v. Tavares,
385 Mass. 140, 145, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1202.
62. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 852, 448 N.E.2d 1114, 1119
(1983); Tavares, 385 Mass. at 145, 430 N.E.2d at 1202; Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379
Mass. 422,443-44,399 N.E.2d 460, 473-74 (1980); see also SMITH supra note 42, § 365.
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behavior. 63
When assessing the voluntariness of confessions under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has historically con
side red whether a confession was the product of some earlier ille
gality.64 For instance, if a suspect's first statement was the product
of actual coercion, any subsequent statement, if part of the same
stream of events, also was deemed to be coerced and therefore was
suppressed. 65 Statements falling on the heels of a violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution also were
subject to suppression: "[A] confession obtained through custodial
interrogation after an illegal arrest should be excluded unless inter
vening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest
and the confession so that the confession is 'sufficiently an act of
free will to purge the primary taint."'66 "Break-in-the-stream-of
63. See Commonwealth v. Silva, 388 Mass. 495, 501, 447 N.E.2d 646, 651 (1983);
Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 267, 431 N.E.2d 880, 895 (1982). A de
fendant's age, education, experience, and drug or alcohol intake are all factors which
the courts consider in assessing the voluntariness of the Miranda waiver and of the
subsequent statement. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 425 Mass. 361, 366, 682 N.E.2d 591, 596 (1997); Com
monwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 664-65, 651 N.E.2d 843, 849 (1995); Tavares, 385
Mass. at 144-46,430 N.E.2d at 1201-03; see also SMITH, supra note 42, § 371 and cases
cited therein.
The first part of the test-judicial review-is constitutionally mandated. See Com
monwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 835, 683 N.E.2d 653, 657 (1997); Tavares, 385
Mass. at 145, 430 N.E.2d at 1202.. The second part-submission of the issue to the
jury-is not constitutionally required. See Watkins, 425 Mass. at 835, 683 N.E.2d at 657;
Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 40, 402 N.E.2d 55, 61 (1980). The prosecution
must prove that the statement was made voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Watkins, 425 Mass. at 835, 683 N.E.2d at 657;.Tavares, 385 Mass. 151-52,430 N.E.2d at
1206.
64. See Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968) (the defendant was held
incommunicado for thirty to forty-eight hours, deprived of counsel, although his attor
neys tried to gain access to him; no break in the stream of events between the time of
subsequent confession and the coercive atmosphere that existed before); Beecher v.
Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 (1967) (no break in the stream of events from the point where
the defendant was initially told, at gunpoint, to speak his guilt or be killed); Clewis v.
Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 708, 710-11 (1967) (the first statement was made immediately after
the arrest that was not supported by probable cause; the defendant was then subjected
to prolonged, although intermittent, questioning; no break in the stream of events insu
lating later confession from "what had occurred before"); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433,
441,444 (1961) (the defendant was held without food, counsel, family; he was physically
weak and in pain; the coercive atmosphere surrounding the first statement led into the
second); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) (continuous coercive process).
65. See infra note 66 and cases cited therein.
66. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (emphasis added) (quoting
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)); accord Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305
06 (1985); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (stating the
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events" thus became a metaphor for the voluntariness test.
The Court also employed another voluntariness metaphor, one
it explained in United States v. Bayer.67
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confess
ing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of
the psychological and practical disadvantages of having con
fessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out
for good. In such a sense, a later confession may always be
looked upon as a fruit of the first. 68

The "cat-out-of-the-bag" test, as first formulated, was subjective:
The cat-out-of-the-bag line of analysis requires the exclusion of a
statement if, in giving the [subsequent] statement, the defendant
was motivated by the belief that, after a prior coerced statement,
his effort to withhold further information would be futile and he
had nothing to lose by repetition or amplification of the earlier
statements. Such a statement would be inadmissible as the direct
product of the earlier coerced statement. 69

Because they bore on the question of actual coercion, the "cat
out-of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests
looked to the effect of the detainee's prior statement, or the con
duct of the interrogation process, on his state of 'mind when he
made the subsequent statement. But, as the Bayer Court noted:
"[T]his Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confes
sion under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually dis
ables the confessor from making a usable one after 'those conditions
have been removed."70 The two tests were not per se rules of ex
clusion. As shall be seen, however, the SJC departed from that sub
jective focus on the question of coercion and applied the tests to
concept of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment
violations).
67. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
68. ld. at 540 (emphasis added).
69. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 686, 335· N.E.2d 660', 675 (1975)
(emphasis added) (a case in which private citizens ipterrogated the defendant; therefore
Miranda did not apply); accord Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 480, 379
.
N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (1978).
70. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540-41 (upholding the admissibility of the defendant's sec
ond confession, made six months after the initial, involuntary one, but aft~r being. told
that his confession could be used against him); see also Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 676, 682,
335 N.E.2d at 669, 673 (while the first confession was coerced, the second was not the
product of intimidation existing at the time of the first statement, and the defendant did
not think that his remarks would expose him to jeopardy).
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Miranda violations absent the existence of actual coercive elements
rendering the statements involuntary.
B.

Massachusetts' Application of the Tests Pre-Elstad

Massachusetts initially applied the "cat-out-of-the-bag" and
the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests to the question of volun
tariness.7 1 It later, like some other jurisdictions, extended the anal
yses to the question of the admissibility in evidence of a properly
warned statement after an initial Miranda violation.72
The SJC properly utilized both tests on the question of volun
tariness in Commonwealth v. Mahnke.7 3 Defendant Mahnke, sus
pected of having murdered his girlfriend, was abducted and
interrogated by her family members and friends. 74 Since the de
fendant was not held and questioned by police officers, the SJC,
reviewing the admissibility of his statements at trial, rejected his
contention of a Miranda violation. 75 The court noted that Miranda
applies only to custodial questioning by law enforcement agents.76
Finding that Miranda did not mandate suppression, the
Mahnke court turned to the Fourteenth Amendment question of
voluntariness.77 The court stated: "A conviction founded in whole
or in part on statements which are the product of physical or psy
chological coercion deprives the defendant of his right to due pro
cess of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and, as a
consequence, is invalid."78 The court reviewed the totality of the
circumstances to decide whether the government met its burden to
prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. 79 The
Mahnke court recognized that a finding that an initial statement
was involuntary does not necessarily require suppression of any
later statements. 80 "It is equally true ... that the defendant may
71. See Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 682-83, 335 N.E.2d at 673; Commonwealth v.
White, 353 Mass. 409, 417,232 N.E.2d 335, 341 (1967).
72. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 482, 379 N.E.2d 1040, 1046-47
(1978); Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 554, 369 N.E.2d 692, 699 (1977); see also
United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nash, 563
F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1977).
73. 368 Mass. at 682-83, 335 N.E.2d at 673.
74. See id. at 699-71, 335 N.E.2d at 666-67.
75. See id. at 676, 335 N.E.2d at 669 .
. 76. See id., 335 N.E.2d at 669-70 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966».
77. See id. at 679, 335 N.E.2d at 671.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 680, 335 N.E.2d at 672.
80. See id. at 681, 335 N.E.2d at 672-73.
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have been under no compulsion at the time of the later statements
and may have felt no effect of the earlier abuse at the time. The
later statements, then, would be admissible."81 An initial coercive
atmosphere does not presumptively taint whatever occurs
afterward.
The court then applied both the "break-in-the-stream-of
events" and "cat-out-of-the-bag" analyses to defendant Mahnke's
statements. 82 The court concluded that, while the defendant's ini
tial statements were the product of intimidation and violence, his
later statements were made after all hostility ceased. 83 Thus, there
had been a break in the stream of events. 84 Nor was the cat out of
the bag, for the defendant did not believe that his earlier state
ments-wherein he described the victim's death as accidental-ex
posed him to serious adverse effects.85 The Mahnke court
concluded that the defendant's later statements were voluntary and,
thus, properly admitted in evidence at his murder tria1. 86 Notable is
the court's application of both metaphors to assess the defendant's
actual mental state on the question of coercion.
In later precedent, the SIC applied the "cat-out-of-the-bag"
and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" voluntariness analyses to
warned statements which followed earlier statements made in viola
tion of Miranda. 87 Without explanation, it shifted Fourteenth
Amendment analysis into the question of the remedy for violations
of the Fifth Amendment.
In Commonwealth v. Haas,88 the court utilized both the "cat
out-of-the-bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests to
determine the admissibility in evidence of the defendant's warned
81. Id. at 682, 335 N.E.2d at 673.
82. See id. at 682-87, 335 N.E.2d at 673-77. The court distinguished the tests by
noting that the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" analysis focuses on whether external
constraints, either continuing or new, overbore the suspect's will, id. at 682,335 N.E.2d
at 673, while the "cat-out-of-the-bag" inquiry looks more specifically at the effect of the
earlier statement on the suspect's will, see id. at 683, 335 N.E.2d at 673. The subsequent
statement cannot "'merely [be] the product of [an] erroneous impression that the cat
was already out of the bag.'" Id. at 687, 335 N.E.2d at 675 (quoting Darwin v. Connect
icut, 391 U.S. 346, 351 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part»; see
also supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the tests).
83. See Mahnke, 368 Mass. at 683-84,335 N.E.2d at 673-74.
84. See id. at 685, 335 N.E.2d at 674.
85. See id. at 687, 335 N.E.2d at 676.
86. See id. at 691,335 N.E.2d at 678.
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472,480-81, 379 N.E.2d 1040,
1045-46 (1978).
88. 373 Mass. 545, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977).
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statement following an earlier Miranda violation. 89 Defendant
Haas reported to work at 7:30 a.m. on June 23,1973. 90 At approxi
mately 10:15 a.m., the defendant told a colleague that he had re
ceived an anonymous telephone call informing him that his family
had been "'taken care of. "'91 The defendant contacted the police
department and asked that someone check on his family'S welfare.92
A police officer went to the defendant's home, found the front door
ajar with a key in the lock, entered the premises, and discovered the
dead bodies of the defendant's wife and children. 93
Subsequent police investigation determined that there was no
sign of forced entry and little sign of physical disturbance. 94 The
medical examiner concluded that the victims died between 3:00 a.m.
and 5:00 a.m.95 When the defendant called to inquire of his family's
well-being, a police officer told him to come home. 96 The defend
ant arrived at home, and police officers transported him to the po
lice station. 97 .There, a police officer apprised the defendant of the
fatalities and asked him when he departed for work that morning. 98
The defendant responded, "'I want to be helpful. 1 left between
6:15 and 6:30."'99 Police officers arrested the defendant and admin
istered the Miranda warnings to him; he reiterated that he left for
work at 6:30 a.m.100 An inventory of the defendant's personal ef
fects disclosed notes bearing the words "'gloves, overalls, bags,
ether, mask. "'101
Charged with the murders of his wife and children, the defend
ant moved to suppress his statements and the physical evidence,
asserting that he should have been advised of the Miranda warnings
. 89. See id. at 554, 369 N.E.2d at 699. .
90. See id. at 546, 369 N.E.2d at 695.
91. Id. at 547, 369 N.E.2d at 695. The defendant told his coworker that the caller
said '''black and white don't mix.'" Id., 369 N.E.2d at 695. The defendant was Cauca
sian; his wife was African-American. See id. at 547 n.1, 369 N.E.2d at 695 n.l.
92. See id. at 547, 369 N.E.2d at 695.
93. See id. Defendant's wife and children lay in their own beds, and their heads
were covered with white plastic bags secured with adhesive tape. See id.
94. See id. Police officers found a sign, reading '''[b]lack and white don't mix'" in
the master bedroom. Id.
95. See id. at 547-48, 369 N.E.2d at 696.
96. See id. at 548, 369 N.E.2d at 695.
97. See id.
98. See id., 369 N.E.2d at 696.
99. Id.
100. See id. Defendant also said that he slept with his wife in the master bedroom
the night before. See id.
101. Id.
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at the outset of questioning.1 02 The trial judge found that the de
fendant had not been subjected to custodial interrogation and de
nied the motion to suppress_ I03
On appeal from his convictions, the defendant claimed that his
arrest was not supported by probable cause; therefore, his state
ments were the tainted fruit of that illegality.l04 The Common
wealth conceded that the police officers did not have probable
cause to arrest the defendant, but contended that he was not in cus
tody.lo5 The SJC held that the defendant indeed was in custody and
therefore should have been informed of the Miranda requisites
before questioning. 106 The court concluded both that there was no
break in the stream of events between the Miranda violation and
the later, warned statement, and that the cat was out of the bag
when the defendant disclosed the time that he left his home.107 The
court applied tests, formulated to assess the effect of an initial, actu
ally coerced statement on the voluntariness of a subsequent state
ment, to a statement made after a technical Miranda violation but
absent any actual coercion. The court, however, did not explain its
reason for extending the voluntariness tests to the question of a Mi
randa violation, which resulted in the exclusion from evidence of
apparently voluntary statements. lOS
Justice Robert Braucher, concurring, found that the exclusion
from evidence of Haas's statements, due solely to a Miranda viola
tion, was "unjust."I09 He questioned the benefit of applying the ex
clusionary rule to that case, where reliable, voluntary statements
were barred from evidence to deter law enforcement misconduct in
a matter wherein the police officers acted in good faith and did not
mislead the defendant. 110 Justice Braucher called upon the United
See id.
See id.
104. See id. at 551,369 N.E.2d at 696 (the defendant relied on Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), apparently
attempting to invoke the Fourth Amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary
rule, which bars the fruit of an unlawful arrest from admission into evidence unless
some circumstance removes the initial taint).
105. See Haas, 373 Mass. at 551, 369 N.E.2d at 697.
106. See id. at 551-52, 369 N.E.2d at 69S.
107. See id. at 554, 369 N.E.2d at 699 ("[T]he cat was out of the bag .... The effect
of the tainted confession was not dissipated by the time of the next confession. A be
lated adequate warning could not put the cat back in the bag.") (quoting Gilpin v.
United States, 415 F.2d 63S, 642 (5th Cir. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
lOS. See id. at 549 n.4, 554 n.S, 369 N.E.2d at 696 n.4, 699 n.S.
109. Id. at 564, 369 N.E.2d at 705 (Braucher, J., concurring).
110. See id. at 565, 369 N.E.2d at 705 (Braucher, J., concurring).
102.
103.
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States Supreme Court to rectify what he perceived to be a confused
and arbitrary rule. lll
While the Haas opinion discloses that the police officers knew
the cat was out of the bag when the defendant told them what time
he left for work, there is nothing in the decision demonstrating that
the defendant also knew that he had made an incriminating admis
sion, other than the occurrence of his formal arrest. No traditional
coercive elements existed, as there was nothing demonstrating that
Haas felt it futile to refuse to speak after making his first statement;
nor was there any inkling of actual coercive forces prompting his
first statement, made because he wished to "'be helpful."'1l2 In
deed, the SJC upheld the trial judge's finding that both statements
were voluntary, deeming that conclusion "amply supported by the
record. "113 Although the court did not expressly say so, it appears
that the court assumed that the presumptive taint of the initial Mi
randa violation extended beyond that initial error to the second,
properly warned statement. This constitutes a confusion of Mi
randa's per se bar of statements taken in violation of its precepts
with the traditional test of voluntariness, which did not presume
that an initial act of coercion necessarily tainted what occurred
afterward.
One year later, the court alluded to Haas in evaluating the ad
missibility of a defendant's statements in another murder case. De
fendant Watkins came to Massachusetts from Kentucky and
participated in the armed robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a
motorist. 114 The defendant fled to Kentucky, where he later was
discovered by law enforcement agents in an automobile matching
the description of the victim's motor vehicle.1 15 Police officers ar
rested the defendant, seized the automobile, searched it, and ascer
tained that it indeed belonged to the victim. 116 The law
enforcement agents from Massachusetts then went to Kentucky, ad
vised the defendant of the Miranda warnings, and questioned
him.1 17 After a few preliminary questions, the defendant requested
counsel; the police officers, however, asked whether the defendant
111.
112.
113.
114.
(1978).
115.
116.
117.

See id. (Braucher, J., concurring).
Id. at 548, 369 N.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 549 n.4, 554 n.8, 369 N.E.2d at 696 n.4, 699 n.8.
See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 375 Mass. 472, 475, 379 N.E.2d 1040, 1043
See id. at 477, 379 N.E.2d at 1044.
See id.
See id.
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wanted an attorney or whether he wished to talk about statements
that he had made to the Kentucky police officers. US The defendant
agreed to speak, and admitted to being in Boston for several
days.119
The defendant again requested an attorney, and the police of
ficers allowed him to use the telephone. 12o The defendant did not
call an attorney; rather, he contacted family members.121 He then
agreed to speak with the police officers and made admissions of the
events culminating in the victim's death. 122
During the defendant's trial, the trial judge conducted a voir
dire concerning the admissibility in evidence of the defendant's
statements and ruled that the defendant had not waived his right to
counseP23 The trial judge concluded that the police officers should
have terminated the interview when the defendant initially re
quested an attorney.124 Finding a violation of the defendant's right
to counsel, the trial judge suppressed all statements made by the
defendant immediately after that point in questioning. 125 The trial
judge, however, admitted into evidence those statements made by
the defendant after he used the telephone, finding that his right to
cut off questioning at that juncture had been scrupulously
honored.12 6 The trial judge also rejected the defendant's conten
tions that his Miranda waiver was not voluntary.127
Relying on Haas in his appeal from his convictions, the defend
ant alleged that the "cat-out-of-the-bag" theory applied, as his later
statements to the police officers were the product of "his mistaken
belief that he had irretrievably implicated himself by his earlier, and
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See
See
See
See
See
123. See
124. See
125. See

id. at 477-78, 379 N.E.2d at 1044.
id. at 478, 379 N.E.2d at 1044.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id., 379 N.E.2d at 1044-45.
id., 379 N.E.2d at 1045; see also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying

text.
126. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 479, 379 N.E.2d at 1045. The trial judge relied on
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See supra note 57 for cases dealing with the
issue of post-Miranda statements. Under Mosley, if a defendant asserts his right to
remain silent, police officers can renew questioning if they immediately terminate the
initial interview upon the defendant's election of his right, allow a significant period of
time to elapse, and administer "fresh" Miranda warnings to him. Mosley, 423 U.S. at
106.
127. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 479, 379 N.E.2d at 1045. The defendant alleged
fear of reprisal, pain due to an automobile collision, and injury resultant from beatings
by police officers. See id.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

194

[Vol. 20:173

subsequently determined, illegal statements."128 The SJC acknowl
edged that the analysis applied to the question whether a confession
had actually been coerced. 129 The Watkins court, however, stated
that the trial judge found, and the record disclosed, that the defend
ant's statements were voluntary and not the result of coercion.13°
The court noted that the Haas court only "peripherally employed"
the "cat-out-of-the-bag" test, in conjunction with the "break-in-the
stream-of-events" test.1 31 In Haas, "[p]roper police questioning,
which elicited the defendant's later statements, was found to have
followed the illegal interrogation closely without a discernible break
in time or the stream of events 'sufficient to insulate the latter state
ments from the events which went before."'132 The court concluded
that neither test availed defendant Watkins: his later statements
substantially differed from his earlier remarks, and, thus, the cat
was not out of the bag; and the second statements were made only
after the defendant had been afforded an opportunity to confer
with counsel, breaking the stream of everits.133
In Haas and Watkins, the trial judges had found, and the SJC
affirmed, that the defendants'. statements were voluntary, despite
the Miranda violations. 134 The court, however, did not articulate its
rationale for extending traditional voiuntaiiness analyses to Mi
randa questions in those cases. The court apparently concluded
that a Miranda violation, creating a technical presumption of ·coer
cion,but not a finding of actual coercion, rionetheless impacted the
voluntariness of the later, warned statemerit.135 Yet, in deciding
that the defendant's later statement must be suppressed, the Haas
[d. at 480-81, 379 N.E.2d at 1046.
129. See id. at 481, 379 N.E.2d at 1046.
130. See id.
131. [d.
132. [d. at 481-82, 379 N.E.2d at 1046 (quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 373
Mass. 545, 554, 369 N.E.2d 692, 699 (1977». The Watkins court apparently interpreted
Haas as a "break-in-the-stream-of-events" case, not a "cat-out-of-the-bag" case.
133. See id. at 482, 379 N.E.2d at 1046-47. Finally, the court concluded thai the
Mosley requisites had been satisfied. See id. at 483-84,379 N.E.2d at 1047-48; see also
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981) (distinguishing the right to counsel
from the right to remain silent but declining to create a per se ban on further question
ing once a defendant has requested counsel). The SJC analogized the right to remain
silent, discussed in Mosley, to the right to counsel. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 483-84,
379 N.E.2d at 1047-48.
134. See Watkins, 375 Mass. at 481, 379 N.E.2d at 1046; Haas, 373 Mass. at 549
n.4, 554 n.8, 369 N.E.2d at 696 n.4, 699 n.8.
135. Other jurisdictions have also employed this analysis to assess the impact of
Miranda violations on later, warned statements. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 699
F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nash, 563 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir.
128.
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court did not expressly find that the defendant's will had been over
borne by any knowledge that his initial, unwarned statement incul
pated him. No aCtual compulsion of either statement manifested
itself in the record. Even under a traditional voluntariness analysis,
an initial coercive act does not taint all that comes after it.136 To
require its suppression under a traditional voluntariness test, the
second statement must be a product of the first. As no traditional
element of involuntariness presented itself in Haas, the application
of the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" and "cat-out-of-the-bag"
tests in that case should not necessarily have mandated suppression
of the defendant's second statement. By joining the traditional vol
untariness tests with Miranda's per serule of exclusion, the SJC had
fashioned a test which could bar from evidence voluntary properly
warned statements.
Ill.

ELSTAD

In Elstad, the United States Supreme Court squarely faced the
question "whether an initial failure of law enforcement officers to
administer the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona ..., with- .
out more, 'taints' subsequent admissions made !lfter a suspect has
been fully advised of and has waived his Miranda rightS."137 De
fendant Elstad, age eightyen, was suspected of burglarizing a neigh
bor's house.138· Police officers went to his home bearing a warrant
for his arrest and spoke with his mother, who led them to the de
fendant's room.139 The police officers asked the defendant, clad in
shorts, to dress and proceed to the living room.140 One police of
ficer then spoke to the defendant's mother in the kitchen, explain
ing that they had a warrant to arrest her son.1 41
The second police officer remained with the defendant, asked
him whether he knew the reason for the visit, and inquired whether
he knew the victim.142 The defendant said yes, noting that he heard
that there had been a robbery at the neighbor's home. 143 The po
1977); see also infra note 200 and accompanying text (stating that the police may not
intentionally withhold Miranda warnings until the suspect has incriminated himself).
136. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947); Commonwealth v.
Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 682, 335 N.E.2d 660, 673 (1975).
137. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1984) (citation omitted).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 300-01.
142. See id. at 301.
143. See id.
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lice officer told the defendant that he suspected his involvement in
the crime, and the defendant responded, "Yes, 1 was there."144
The police officers then took the defendant to their cruiser; the
defendant's father arrived home, and the police officers told him
that the defendant was a burglary suspect.1 45 The defendant's fa
ther, very agitated, said, "'I told you that you were going to get into
trouble. You wouldn't listen to me. You never learn."'146
Police officers interrogated the defendant at the police station
approximately one hour later, after administering the Miranda
warnings to him.147 The defendant acknowledged that he under
stood the rights, agreed to speak with the police officers, and gave
an incriminating statement. 148
At the trial for the burglary charge, the defendant alleged that
the cat had been let out of the bag; he also said that the confession
was the fruit of the poisonous tree.1 49 The trial judge excluded the
defendant's initial statement that he had been present at the crime
scene, because the defendant had not received the Miranda warn
ings.1 50 He, however, found that the second statement, uttered at
the police station, was voluntarily made after receipt of the warn
ings and allowed it into evidence. 151
On appeal before the Oregon Court of Appeals, the govern
ment conceded that the defendant had been in custody in his home,
necessitating the Miranda warnings and requiring suppression of
that statement. 152 The appellate court found that the subsequent
warned statement did not follow a break in the stream of events,
mandating reversal of the defendant's conviction. 153 The Oregon
Supreme Court declined further review, and the case came before
the United States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari.1 54
The Elstad Court reviewed the evolution of Miranda, noting
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 302 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963»; see
also United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947) ("[A]fter an accused has once let
the cat out of the bag[,] ... [h]e can never get the cat back in the bag.").
150. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 302.
151. See id.
152. See id.; see also State v. Elstad, 658 P.2d 552 (1983), rev'd sub nom. Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
153. See Elstad, 658 P.2d at 554. The court found that the cat was out of the bag.
See id. at 555.
154. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303 n.3.
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that, before that decision, the admissibility of a confession turned
on the Fourteenth Amendment question of voluntariness. 155 As
Miranda created a presumption that custodial statements made
without the warnings were coerced, due to the inherent coercive
ness of custodial interrogation, it "required suppression of many
statements that would have been admissible under traditional due
process analysis ...."156 Therefore, a voluntary statement, if the
product of a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda, must
be suppressed under the Fifth Amendment even though it would be
admissible under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court rejected the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis,
finding it applicable only to violations of the Fourth Amendment.1 57 .
In contrast, while the Miranda presumption of coerciveness is ir
rebuttable as per the statement obtained in violation of its precepts,
its fruits need not be "discarded as inherently tainted."158 The
Court explained that the warnings are not themselves part of the
Fifth Amendment, but serve only to protect a suspect's self-incrimi
nation right. 159
The Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment
and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself....
The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case
in chief only of compelled testimony. Failure to administer Mi
randa warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Conse
quently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless
be excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individ
ual case, Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even
to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional
harm. l60

The Court concluded that, absent actual coercion, a Miranda viola
tion need not bar the admission in evidence of a subsequent, prop
155. See id. at 303; see also supra notes 41-43, 64-70 and accompanying text.
156. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303.
157. See id. at 305-06; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
158. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307.
159. See id. at 305. The" 'fruit of the poisonous tree' [test] assumes ... a constitu·
tional violation." [d. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule thus exists to deter
unlawful searches, regardless of their fruits. See id. at 306. The exclusionary rule in the
Fifth Amendment, however, is distinct from the one under the Fourth Amendment. See
id. "Where a Fourth Amendment violation 'taints' the confession, a finding of volunta
riness for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement in
determining whether the confession was ... caused by the Fourth Amendment viola·
tion." [d. (citing Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982».
160. [d. at 306-07.
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erly warned statement. 161
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted
that:
the task of defining "custody" is a slippery one, and "policemen
investigating serious crimes [cannot realistically be expected to]
make no errors whatsoever." ... If errors are made by law en
forcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda
procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable conse
quences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It
is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple fail
ure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual co
ercion or other circumstances. calculated to undermine the
suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is inef
fective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires
that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibil
ity of any subsequent statement should tum in these circum
stances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made .162

A police officer's error in judgment is not tantamount to deliberate
coercion, which offends due process and renders the reliability of
the detainee's statement suspect. The Court decided that a second,
prop~rly warned statement need not be subject to automatic exclu
sion: "[T]here is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where
the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in vio
lation of Miranda, was voluntary. The relevant inquiry is whether,
in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made."163 In re
jecting the concept of a presumptive taint, the Supreme' Court thus
returned the focus to the suspect's actual mental state. .
The Elstad Court declared the "cat-out-of-the-bag'" and
"break-in-the-stream-of~events" metaphors inapt, as they apply to
the question of voluntariness, not the technical coercion implicit in
a Miranda violation. 164 The metaphoric tests should be employed
to assess the voluntariness of later statements made after an initial,
involuntary one.
161. See id. at 308-09. The Court extended Michigan v. Tucker, 414 U.S. 433
(1974), which declined to suppress the testimony o~ a witness whose identity was discov
ered through a statement made in violation of Miranda, see id. at 445-46, to a defend
ant's own voluntary statement after a noncoercive Miranda violation, see Elstad, 470
U.S. at 308-09.
162. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (alteration in
original) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446).
163. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
164. See id. at 310-12.
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Considering the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" analysis, the
Court noted that, "of the courts· that have considered whether a
properly warned confession must be suppressed because it was pre
ceded by an unwarned but clearly voluntary admission, the majority
have explicitly or implicitly recognized that [the] requirement of a
break in the stream of events is inapposite. "165 The Court con
cluded that administration of the Miranda warnings will cure the
error, for "[t]he warning conveys the relevant information and
thereafter ,the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to
remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an 'act of free will."'l66
That is, the invocation of the Miranda warnings should be sufficient
to terminate the taint of the initial Miranda violation.
As for the "cat-out-of-the-bag" analysis, the Court held that its
application to Miranda breaches would "disable" law enforcement,
where the cat's emergence from the bag was due to the suspect's
own act, not any actual law enforcement coercion. 167 It stated:
This Court has never held that the psychological impact of volun
tary disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies as state compulsion or
compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed
. waiver.... [A]dopt[ion of] this expansive view of Fifth Amend
ment compulsion, effectively immunizes a suspect who responds
to pre-Miranda warning questions from the consequences of his
subsequent . informed waiver of the priviiege of remaining
.
silent. 168

The Court accurately repositioned the "cat-out-of-the-bag" ques
tion into the context of coercion by law enforcement agents. 169
The Court concluded that an initial, voluntary statement made
in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, but the admissibility of
a subsequent, warned confession hinges upon the question whether
it also was voluntarily made. 170 The Court said:
165. Id. at 310 & n.2. Interestingly, the Court cited Commonwealth v. White, 353
Mass. 409,232 N.E.2d 335 (1967), as one such decision. In White, the SJC had rejected
the defendant's suggestion that one illegally obtained statement presumptively tainted
any subsequent statement, noting that the question of the admissibility in evidence of
the subsequent statement turns on the question whether the defendant made it volunta
rily. See id. at 417, 232N.E.2d at 341. The Haas court did not cite White.
166. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311 (quoting Wong .Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
486 (1963».
.
167. [d.; see also supra notes 69-70.
168. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (emphasis added).
169. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases
involving voluntary statements by the defendant, and statements obtained through co
ercion by private citizens).
170. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18.
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subsequent administration of the Miranda warnings to a suspect
who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily
should suffice to. remove the conditions that precluded admission
of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact
may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and in
telligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.1 71

The admissibility of the second statement is decided by review
ing the totality of the circumstances: "[T]he finder of fact must ex
amine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of
police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the volunta
riness of his statements. The fact that a suspect chooses to speak
after being informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative."I72
Examining the totality of circumstances surrounding Elstad's
questioning, the Court deemed "the causal connection between any
psychological disadvantage created by [Elstad's first] admission and
his ultimate decision to cooperate ... speculative and attenuated at
best."173 Elstad's second statement, wholly voluntary, was admissi
ble in evidence against him.174 The Elstad Court thus separated the
Fifth Amendment Miranda exclusionary rule from the Fourteenth
Amendment tests for voluntariness, as blended by Haas and
Watkins.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a dissent to which Justice
Thurgood Marshall joined, proclaimed that Elstad delivered a "po
tentially crippling blow" to Miranda. 175 He protested the denuding
of the" 'fruit of the poisonous tree'" test.1 76 Justice Brennan's con
cerns may pose some credence. If review of the voluntariness of
the second, properly warned statement after an initial Miranda vio
lation does not allow consideration of the first statement's impact
on the suspect's decision to make the second, then the "totality of
the circumstances" are not examined. Indeed, other courts have
summarily rejected the defendants' "cat-out-of-the-bag" claims, cit
ing Elstad. l77 But the second statement may be the fruit of the Mi
171. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 318.
173. Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added).
174. See id. at 318.
175. Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 367 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986) (the defendant
claimed that his second statement was a fruit of the first, but, as the defendant did not
claim that second confession was elicited under pressure, and the record disclosed no
such pressure, the second statement was admissible in evidence); Martin v. Wainwright,
770 F.2d 918, 928-29 (11th Cir. 1985) (as the police officers did not use "physical vio
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randa violation if the suspect believes that, in making the first
statement, he has "spilled the beans" and therefore has nothing to
lose by continuing to speak. By making the exclusive source of the
first statement the suspect's own guilty conscience, and by ignoring
the import of the first, unwarned statement on the suspect's frame
of mind in making the second, warned one, the Elstad Court argu
ably begs the question of voluntariness. 178
Further, Justice Brennan suggested that police officers might
withhold provision of the Miranda warnings until they gain a con
fession and only then belatedly administer the Miranda warnings. 179
In United States v. Carter,180 however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit faced such a scenario and found that
Elstad "did not go so far as to fashion a rule permitting this sort of
end run around Miranda."181 The law enforcement agents in Carter
clearly knew that the defendant was in custody; their failure to ad
minister the Miranda warning therefore could not be interpreted as
a good-faith mistake. 182 The Carter court concluded that the de
fendant's second statement must be suppressed. 183 Elstad thus does
not allow police officers to ignore, or manipulate, Miranda.

IV.

MASSACHUSETIS' DEFEcrION FROM ELSTAD

The SJC considered Elstad's application in Commonwealth v.
Smith.1 84 Like Justice Brennan, the SJC apparently was troubled
by Elstad.
Defendant Smith and his friend Duclos were suspected of hav
ing executed Duclos's parents by rifle fire.1 85 Duclos and his
mother had quarreled over the proceeds of an insurance policy, and
Smith had disliked the woman since she prevented him from taking
lence" or "other deliberate means" to elicit the first, unwarned statement, the failure to
timely give the Miranda warnings did not "automatically require the exclusion of the
[later, warned] confession").
178. Indeed, finding police officers "ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel," the
Court declared that the suspect need not be apprised that the first statement must be
suppressed due to the Miranda violation, when electing whether to waive his self-in
crimination rights. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. The Court noted that it "has never em
braced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions
vitiates their voluntariness." Id.
179. See id. at 318 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989).
181. Id. at 373.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 375.
184. 412 Mass. 823, 829, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1291 (1992).
185. See id. at 824-25, 593 N.E.2d at 1289.
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a gun and shooting his own mother.1 86
Duclos reported the fatal shootings to his grandmother, who
summoned the police department. 187 Police officers found the vic
tims' bodies and asked Duclos to come to the police station.1 88 Du
clos complied and initially named the defendant as an alibi witness,
contending that the two had been" 'four-wheeling'" in his truck at
the time of the murders.189 After a police officer spotted blood
spatters on Duclos's socks, Duclos acknowledged his involvement
in the crime, but said that the defendant Smith fired the fatal
shotS.190
Armed with Duclos' admissions, the police officers questioned
defendant Smith at the police station without administering the Mi
randa warnings to him.191 The defendant confirmed Duclos's initial
alibi that the two had been '''4 wheeling.'''192 One police officer
ultimately administered the Miranda warnings to the defendant,
told the defendant that he did not believe him, and informed him
that Duclos had implicated him in the murders.193 The defendant
then admitted his participation in the effort to conceal the crime,
denied that he fired the fatal shots, and impliedly claimed that Du
clos had killed his own parents. 194
The trial judge suppressed the defendant's initial statements,
finding a Miranda violation, but allowed the later, warned admis
sions into evidence.1 95 On appeal from his first-degree murder con
victions, the defendant challenged that ruling. 196
The SJC flatly rejected Elstad and instead followed a line of
pre- Elstad precedent perceiving· a presumptive taint of an initial
Miranda violation on later, warned statements. 197 The court traced
186. See id. at 824-25, 824 n.1, 593 N.E.2d at 1289 & n.l.
187. See id. at 825, 593 N.E.2d at 1289.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 826, 593 N.E.2d at 1290.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 827, 593 N.E.2d at 1290.
192. See id., 593 N.E.2d at 1291.
193. See id. at 828, 593 N.E.2d at 1291.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 829, 593 N.E.2d at 1291.
196. See id. at 825, 593 N.E.2d at 1289.
197. See id. at 829-30, 593 N.E.2d at 1291-92. Those cases, which included Haas
as well as decisions of some other federal and state courts, were decided before Elstad,
and therefore were not controlling or persuasive authority. While other jurisdictions
previously applied the Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness tests to determine
whether a Miranda violation should result in the suppression of later statements, see,
e.g., United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nash,
563 F.2d 1166, 1169 (5th Cir. 1977), the Elstad Court corrected that error. See Elstad,
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the history of federal constitutional law prior to Elstad and con
tended that a Miranda violation presumptively tainted any subse
quent confession by an accused. 198 The court focused on both the
"break-in-the-stream -of-events" and "cat-out -of-the-bag" tests.199
The Smith court explained that the presumed taint
was intended to deter law enforcement officials from circum
venting the Miranda requirements by using the warnings strategi
cally-first questioning a suspect without benefit of the warnings,
and then, having obtained an incriminating response or having
otherwise benefited from the coercive atmosphere, by giving the
Miranda warnings and questioning the suspect again in order to
obtain an admissible statement. 2oo

The court concluded that the "presumption of taint is also consis
tent with the constitutional principle that the government bears the
burden to show that a defendant's custodial statement was freely
willed."201 The SJC held to its view that an initial Miranda breach
affects the voluntariness of any later statement.202 This holdiJ1g is in
complete conflict with Elstad.
The court then discussed the "break-in-the-stream-of-events"
and the "cat-out-of-the-bag" tests, explaining that the. first test
looked to whether external constraints, old or new, overbore the
defendant's will, while the latter test looked to whether the subse
quent statement was a product of the suspect's conclusion that he
had let the secret out for good in his earlier statement. 203 The court
alluded to Haas and lfatkins, saying that defendant Haas had let
the cat out of the bag during initial questioning and his later,
warned statement followed so closely on the illegal interrogation
that there had been no break in the chain of events, and noting that
defendant Watkins had not made an inculpatory statement in his
470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985). That other courts previously applied the Fourteenth
Amendment tests to Miranda violations demonstrates that Massachusetts was not alone
in its misinterpretation of federal precedent before Elstad, but nonetheless gives no
validity to the SIC's rejection of Elstad once the Supreme Court had clarified the disc
tinction between Miranda and voluntariness questions.
198. See Smith, 412 Mass. at 829; 593 N.E.2d at 1291-92.
199. See id. at 830, 593 N.E.2d at 1292.
.
200. Id. at 829, 593 N.E.2d at 1292. But see United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368,
373, 375 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that ELStad did not allow police officers to inten
tionally withhold the Miranda warnings until a suspect incriminated himself,' only then
to administer them).
201. Smith, 412 Mass. at 829-30, 593 N.E.2d at 1292.
202. See id. at 830, 593 N.E.2d at 1292 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368
" .'
.
Mass. 662,682,335 N.E.2d 660, 673 (1975».
203. See id. at 830-31, 593 N.E.2d at 1292.
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first interrogation, so the cat was not out of the bag, and his second
statement had been temporally removed from the initial
questioning. 204
The court then turned to Elstad, which had rejected the notion
of the presumptive taint. 205 The trial judge had concluded that
Smith was not subjected to any pressure, was not under the influ
ence of alcohol or drugs, and was willing to speak with the police
officers. 206 The court concluded: "This evidence supports the
judge's ultimate finding that the defendant's statements were volun
tary and, therefore, that his second statement would be admissible as
a matter o/present Federal constitutionallaw."207 Under Elstad, this
should have ended the court's inquiry.
But the Smith court, as the defendant urged, applied Haas to
the case. Although the trial judge had not applied the "break-in
the-stream-of-events" test, the Smith court concluded that no break
had occurred, as the defendant was subjected to a single, continu
ous interrogation. 2og Further, although the trial judge concluded
that the "cat-out-of-the-bag" test, as in Watkins, did not apply be
cause the defendant had not implicated himself in his first state
ment, the court deemed that holding "clearly erroneous," for .the
defendant let the proverbial cat out of the bag by reciting Duclos's
alibi, which the police officers then knew to be false. 209 As in Haas,
however, it appears that, while the police officers knew that the de
fendant made a fatal slip, the defendant did not.2 l0 He was una
ware that the cat was out of the bag; therefore, the second
statement was not triggered by the first. To the contrary, the court
said that the "defendant may have believed, mistakenly, that his
204. See id. at 831, 593 N.E.2d at 1292-93.
205. See id. at 832, 593 N.E.2d at 1293.
206. See id.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. See id.
209. Id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1295. The court, however, rejected the prosecu
tion's contention that the case was akin to Watkins, because Smith's initial statement-a
false alibi planned with Duc1os--exhibited consciousness of guilt and, thus, was much
more inculpatory than Watkins's statements. See id. at 834 & n.lO, 593 N.E.2d at 1294
& n.l0. The court said that "[t]he first statement, if available to the prosecution, would
have constituted strong evidence of consciousness of guilt." Id. at 834, 593 N.E.2d at
1294. The first statement, however, was not available to the Commonwealth because it
was made absent provision of the Miranda warnings and therefore was suppressed. See
id. at 829, 593 N.E.2d at 1291. There is no evidence demonstrating that the defendant
knew he had inculpated himself with the first statement; to the contrary, the appellate
court mentioned the interrogating police officer's omission of the details of Duc1os's
statement when he questioned the defendant. See id. at 828 n.6, 593 N.E.2d at 1291 n.6.
210. See id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1294-95.
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statement was exculpatory_"211 Since the police officers knew that
the defendant had incriminated himself, the court held that they
were obligated to create a break in the chain of events to insulate
the defendant's statement from the earlier illegality.212 The court,
therefore, declared Smith's second statement inadmissible in
evidence. 213
As a "common-law rule of evidence," the Smith court con
cluded that it "shall, in a situation where Federal law requires Mi
randa protections, continue to follow the principles set forth in
Commonwealth v. Haas."214 The court also resurrected the concept
of presumptive taint eliminated by Elstad. 215 The court considered
its rule a boon to criminal trials, for it would eliminate "fact-bound
inquiries into the voluntariness of confessions, where police officers
are generally more credible witnesses than criminal defendants. "216
Yet, as Justice Braucher noted in his Haas concurrence, application
of a rigid exclusionary rule, without regard for the particular facts
of the case, can result in arbitrary rulings.217 Further, the court im
plicitly rejected Elstad's call for a review of the totality of the cir
cumstances to determine whether the second, warned statement is
voluntary. This per se rule of exclusion also is a departure from
Bayer and Mahnke, which focused on the question whether, in light
of the circumstances, the second statement was tainted by the
first.218 Finally, Smith's statements were found to be voluntary,
making their suppression from evidence akin to a per se rule of
exclusion.219
In a footnote, the SJC acknowledged that the "cat-out-of-the
bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests are distinct, but
declined to discuss their relationship.22O The court also rejected the
prosecution's contention that, since the defendant had not incrimi
nated himself in his first statement, the "break-in-the-stream-of
events" test did not require suppression. 221 It posited that the test
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
(1977).
218.
Mahnke,
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1295.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296.
See id. at 836, 593 N.E.2d at 1295.
[d. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296.
See Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 564-65, 369 N.E.2d 692-705
See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947); Commonwealth v.
368 Mass. 662, 676, 686, 335 N.E.2d 666, 669, 675 (1975).
See Smith, 373 Mass. at 832, 593 N.E.2d at 1293.
See id. at 833-34, 833 n.9, 593 N.E.2d at 1293-94, 1293 n.9.
See id. at 835, 593 N.E.2d at 1294-95.
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could require suppression of a later, incriminating statement in
some instances, suggesting that a technical violation of Miranda,
absent coercion or an incriminating statement, might create a per se
rule of exclusion for all subsequent statements. 222 This is precisely
the immunity that Elstad tried to prevent. 223
The Smith court then adopted Haas as "a common-law rule of
evidence."224 The SJC, however, neglected to adopt the Miranda
warnings themselves under the state law. Further, the protection
against self-incrimination has no history in Massachusetts common
law, bu~ exists in Article Twelve of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights. 225 The court's application of tests rejected by the
Supreme Court to determine the consequences of a violation of the
federal Miranda warnings thus was not a legitimate exercise of its
power to create and define state law. Rather, it was an affront to
the concept of federalism. 226 Justice Joseph R. Nolan, dissenting,
spoke plainly and succinctly:
The rule of ... Elstad . .. should be followed. There, the United
States Supreme Court correctly left to the fact finder the only
crucial question, whether the suspect made a rational and intelli
gerit choice either to waive or invoke his rights after Miranda,
warnings had been given. I dissent. 227

In his view, as the Supreme Court had established a rule, the SJC
was bound to apply it to the facts of the case before it.
If provision of the Miranda warnings, creatures of federal con
stitutional law, are required under federal constitutional analysis,
222. The defendant, eighteen years of age, had left high school without graduat
ing. See id. at 824, 593 N.E.2d at 1289. The court contrasted the interrogating police
officer's eighteen years of experience with the defendant's age. See id. at 827 nA, 593
N.E.2d at 1290 nA. Unlike the Elstad Court, it is apparent that the Smith court focused
on the police officer's state of mind. Although the Smith court noted the danger of
p,olice officers manipulating the timing of Miranda warnings in order to procure an
inculpatory statement, see id. at 829, 593 N,E.2d at 1292, the court did not expressly find
that the law enforcement agents here had so manipulated Smith. Had the court made
such a finding, it could have suppressed the statements under United States v. Carter,
884 F.2d 368, 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1989), without rejecting Elstad and fashioning a state
rule.
223. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).
224. Smith, 412 Mass. at 837, 593 N.E.2d at 1296.
225. See MASS. CONST. art. XII ("No subject shall be ... compelled to accuse, or
furnish evidence against himself, ..."); Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677, 682,
639 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 (1994); Opinions of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1206, 591
N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (1992).
226. See supra notes 3-4.
227. Smith, 412 Mass. at 838, 593 N.E.2d at 1296 (Nolan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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then the SJC cannot apply a state-devised test for exclusion of evi
dence produced after the Miranda violation, but must apply the
federal test. The Supreme Court devised an exclusionary rule in
Miranda and defined its scope in Elstad. The legal justification for
the SJC's devising of its own rule under state "common law" is
highly suspect. The state court simply flouted the Supreme Court's
authority.
While Elstad raises some concerns, it is a decision of the
United States Supreme Court. The SJC has not adopted the Mi
randa warnings as part of Article Twelve.228 If, as is apparent, the
court did not approve of Elstad's rejection of the "cat-out-of-the
bag" and the "break-in-the-stream-of-events" tests, it nonetheless
should not have devised a state common-law rule of exclusion to
replace that enunciated by the Elstad Court. Rather, the court
should have embraced the Miranda warnings under Article Twelve.
It then would be free to devise a state exclusionary rule for a state
constitutional violation. That rule then would rest wholly within
state law and would be completely legitimate.
.
Since Smith, the SJC has adhered to its two-test stance without
explaining why two tests are necessary and which applies to a given
case.229 The court also has continued in its application of the "cat
out-of-the-bag" test without examining the impact of an initia,l, un
warned statement on the defendant's actual state of mind when
electing to make a subsequent statement upon receipt of the Mi
randa warnings~ 230 This eliminates the traditional finding of actual
228. See supra note 29 and the accompanying text.
229. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 799-800, 800 n.8, 678 N.E.2d
847, 852 & n.8 (1997) (reciting tests and noting, without explaining, that the question
whether one or both applies is determined by the facts of the case); Commonwealth v.
Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13, 660 N.E.2d 660, 662 (1996) (briefly reciting both tests and
affirming trial judge's conclusion that both tests were satisfied); Commonwealth v.
Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 580-84, 580 n.lO, 651 N.E.2d 833, 840-42, 840 n.lO (1995) (holding
that either or both tests apply, depending on the facts of the case); Commonwealth v.
Osachuk, 418 Mass. 229, 235-37, 635 N.E.2d 1192, 1195-96 (1994) (applying both tests
and concluding that the cat was out of the bag and that there was no break in the stream
of events).
230. See Damiano, 422 Mass. at 11, 13, 660 N.E.2d at 662 (where a cabdriver was
found dead in the middle of a highway and the defendant had been observed running
about, scantily clad, and acting irrationally, the court found that the initial Miranda
violation required suppression of the second, warned statement; the court concluded
that the unwarned statement was incriminating as it placed the defendant at the homi
cide scene, but the court did not expressly examine the impact of the first statement on
the defendant's state of mind when making the second); Osachuk, 418 Mass. at 236-37,
635 N.E.2d at 1196-97 (focusing on the incriminating nature of the defendant's initial,
unwamed statement, not his state of mind). But see Prater, 420 Mass. at 583, 651
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coercion from the test. Further, the court's suggestion that a Mi
randa violation that does not produce an incriminating statement
might require suppression of a later, warned statement if there is no
break in the stream of events hints of the per se rule of exclusion
which the Elstad Court took measures to guard against. Apart
from its arbitrariness, the court's undermining of the concept of
federalism is particularly troubling, since the .court has available,
and has not hesitated to employ in other cases,231 the state
constitution. 232
CONCLUSION

Regardless of one's opinion as to the soundness of the United
States Supreme Court's reasoning in Elstad, the decision nonethe
N.E.2d at 842 ('" A principal reason why a suspect might make a second or third confes
sion is simply that ... he might think he has little to lose by repetition."') (quoting
Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 350-51 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dis
senting in part) (alteration in original)); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 687,
335 N.E.2d 660, 675-76 (1975) (finding no cat out of the bag because the defendant did
not feel that he had damned himself by his earlier statement).
231. See supra note 23 and cases cited for examples.
232. Also unsettling is the court's failure to articulate the basis within state law
for its new rule. The court has acted arbitrarily on other occasions, often adopting a
rejected federal test in the wake of a new federal decision. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 785-89, 665 N.E.2d 93, 95-98 (1992) (rejecting California v.
Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), as the definition for a "stop," and adopting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), tests no
longer viable after Hodari D., under Article Fourteen); Commonwealth v. Amendola,
406 Mass. 592, 599-600, 599 n.3, 550 N.E.2d 121, 125 & n.3 (1990) (noting only that
Article Fourteen of the state constitution sometimes confers more protections than
does the Fourth Amendment, the court decided that the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), was more compelling than that
in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), which had overruled Jones's automatic
standing rule as no longer necessary, and adopted a rule of automatic standing under
Article Fourteen). The court's predilection for resurrecting outmoded federal law has
left criminal practitioners and the state's intermediate Massachusetts Appeals Court in
limbo, requiring practitioners and the intermediate court to apply both old and new
federal analyses to a settled federal question in anticipation of the SJC's possible devia
tion from the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 420 Mass. 458, 462
66,650 N.E.2d 1257, 1259-62 (1995) (stating that for nearly twenty years, Appeals Court
followed Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977), on the question of undue sugges
tiveness of identification procedures, while the SJC adhered to Commonwealth v.
Botelho, 369 Mass. 860, 343 N.E.2d 876 (1976)). In Johnson, the SJC finally embraced
Botelho under Article 1Welve of the state constitution); Commonwealth v. Harkess, 35
Mass. App. Ct. 26, 629 & n.l, 624 N.E.2d 581, 584 & n.l (1993) (applying both Terry
Mendenhall and Hodari D. analyses, while noting that it was up to the SJC to deter
mine what was the proper test under Article Fourteen). As the SJC often does not
explain the historical basis for finding state constitutional or common-law rules more
protective than federal tests, practitioners and lower courts must divine whether, and
how, the court will depart from federal law.
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less is a statement from the nation's highest Court concerning a
principle of federal constitutional law and its application. The Mas
sachusetts SJC, dissatisfied with the Elstad rule, was free as a mat
ter of state constitutional or common law to adopt the Miranda
warnings and to administer any test of its own devising to assess the
consequences of their violation. Since the state self-incrimination
right exists within Article Twelve, the state constitution would have
been the proper vehicle for adoption of the Miranda warnings. In
stead, the court created common-law "adjuncts" to Miranda with
out adopting the whole to which they attach.
Further, when applying Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness
tests, which focus on actual coercion, to a Miranda, Fifth Amend
ment violation, the SJC has removed the analyses' subjective com
ponent. If there is no break in the stream of events, even if a
suspect has not incriminated himself, later, properly warned state
ments nonetheless may be suppressed. Similarly, if the police of
ficers know, but the suspect is unaware, that the suspect has
incriminated himself, then the cat is out of the bag. As the Elstad
Court noted, requiring suppression of voluntary statements because
of police officers' technical missteps, without any overbearing of the
defendant's will, extends Miranda beyond the contemplated param
eters of the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule.

